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Classifying Network Intrusions:











Network intrusion is an increasingly serious problem experienced by many organizations. In this increasingly hostile envi-
ronment, networks must be able to detect whether a connection attempt is legitimate or not. The ever-changing nature of
these attacks makes them difficult to detect. One solution is to use various data mining methods to determine if the network is
being attacked. This paper compares the performance of two data mining methods— i.e., a standard artificial neural network
(ANN) and an ANN guided by genetic algorithm (GA)— in classifying network connections as normal or attack. Using con-
nection data drawn from a simulated US Air Force local area network each method was used to construct a predictive model.
The models were then applied to validation data and the results were compared. The ANN guided by GA (90.67% correct
classification) outperformed the standard ANN (81.75% correct classification) significantly, indicating the superiority of GA-
based ANN.
Key Words
Network intrusion detection, artificial neural network, genetic algorithm, classification methods.
INTRODUCTION
Information and communication technologies (ICTs) have become an integral part of organizations over the past few dec-
ades. Advanced electronic networks and complex information systems have enabled organizations to process, store and trans-
mit digital data in order to increase productivity and organizational effectiveness. Organizations are now creating complex
networked systems and opening their networks to external and internal stakeholders (Chin, 1999). Even though most users of
these networks are legitimate, the number of illegitimate users who access and use these networks is increasing at an alarm-
ing rate (Zhu, Premkumar, Zhang and Chu, 2001). The increased interconnectivity of these complex networks, along with
greater access and dependence on the Internet, has boosted the scale and scope of information technology security breaches
and related crimes (Zhu et al., 2001; Cavusoglu, Mishra and Raghunathan, 2002). Therefore, network security has become a
major concern for organizations and IT managers (Mehta and George, 2001).
Even with the emphasis placed on security today, the number of computer security breaches continues to increase each year.
A 2002 survey conducted by the CSI/FBI reports that ninety percent (90%) of large corporations and agencies detected com-
puter security breaches within the last twelve months, while eighty percent (80%) acknowledged financial losses due to secu-
rity breaches (Power, 2002). According to a CERT/CC report, computer security vulnerabilities more than doubled in 2001,
with 1,090 separate security holes reported in 2000, and 2,437 reported in 2001 (www.cert.org). The number of reported in-
cidents also drastically increased with 21,756 documented in 2000 and 52,658 in 2002. Riptech has reported that general
Internet attack trends are showing a sixty four percent (64%) annual growth rate based on continual 24 x 7 monitoring of For-
tune 1000 companies (www.riptech.com).
While the costs of network security crime are difficult to measure (Newmann, 1999), experts believe that the costs are sub-
stantial and growing exponentially. Some researchers believe that these costs are doubling each year (Lukasik, 2000). The
actual costs are almost impossible to identify because many cyber crimes are not reported. Ullman and Ferrera (1998) state
that according to FBI estimates, only seventeen percent (17%) of computer crimes are reported to government authorities.
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Estimates provided by the Computer Security Institute and the FBI show that organizations lost $124 million in 1999, $266
million in 2000, $378 million in 2001, and $456 million in 2002 due to various computer crimes (Power, 2002).
In recent years, network intrusion detection has become increasingly important (Zhu et al., 2001). While traditional ap-
proaches to network security have focused only on prevention, network intrusion detection can enable organizations to reduce
undetected intrusion. In this study, we employ two data mining methods to classify network intrusions into multiple catego-
ries. Even though studies have compared the performance of various data mining methods, the results have been conflicting.
Also, very few studies have examined the relative performance of various methods in the context of network intrusion detec-
tion. The absence of such studies is the motivation for the current work. The current work is different from earlier compara-
tive studies on at least two counts. First, while most earlier works limit the number of classification categories to two groups,
we use multiple groups for classification. Multiple group classification provides more insight into the types of network at-
tacks and can guide organizations to place emphasis on specific attack types. Second, we use a an artificial neural network
(ANN) guided by genetic algorithms (GA) which has been configured to maximize the classification rate as opposed to
minimize the average error function normally used. To our knowledge, ours is one of the very few studies that employs such
a technique.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows:
1. First, we provide the research background on network security and data mining methods, the two areas that form the
foundation of this study.
2. Second, we introduce the data mining methods used in this study. These methods are standard ANN and an ANN
guided by genetic algorithms.
3. Third, we discuss our research methodology that includes our data collection process, data preparation, and model
development.
4. Finally, we present our results and discuss the implications, limitations, and future research directions.
BACKGROUND
Network Security
Lunt (1993) determined that there are two broad issues relevant to network security: protection and detection. More recently
a third type of mechanism has been added: response (Cavusoglu, Raghunathan and Mishra, 2002). Protection techniques
(also known as prevention) such as firewalls are designed to guard hardware, software, and user data against threats from
both outsiders and malicious insiders (Zhu et al., 2001). Detection mechanisms like intrusion detection systems (IDS) try to
detect the intrusions by collecting information from a variety of systems and network sources (e.g., operating systems or
firewall log files) and then analyzing the information for signs of intrusion and misuse. Finally, response mechanisms deal
with how a network responds to a security threat in order to protect the network from intrusion.
The major functions performed by an intrusion detection system, according to Zhu et al. (2001), are: (1) monitoring and ana-
lyzing user and system activity, (2) assessing the integrity of critical system and data files, (3) recognizing activity patterns
reflecting known attacks, (4) responding automatically to detected activity, and (5) reporting the outcome of the detection
process. Zhu et al. (2001) classified the intrusion detection tasks into two categories: misuse detection and anomaly detection.
Misuse detection systems detect attacks based on well-known vulnerabilities and intrusions stored in a database, while anom-
aly detection systems detect deviations in activity from normal profiles.
Misuse detection systems use various techniques including rule-based expert systems, model-based reasoning systems, state
transition analysis, genetic algorithms, fuzzy logic, and keystroke monitoring. The major limitation of misuse detection sys-
tems is their reliance on existing attack information and vulnerabilities. The rules and logic of the systems have to be con-
tinually updated as new forms of attacks are identified (Zhu et al., 2001). On the other hand, anomaly detection systems use
techniques such as statistical analysis, sequence analysis, ANN, machine learning, and artificial immune systems (Zhu et al.,
2001). These techniques reduce the reliance on updated rules by comparing the suspect access against “normal” usage pat-
terns. In this paper, our primary focus is on anomaly detection.
OVERVIEW OF DATA MINING METHODS
As mentioned earlier, two data mining methods for classification are used in this study: a standard back propagation ANN
and an ANN guided by GA. Standard ANNs have been used in several intrusion detection studies (e.g., Fox, Henning, Reed
and Simonian, 1990; Debar, Becker and Siboni, 1992; Bonafacio, Cansian, Carvalho and Moreira, 1997; Lee, Stolfo and
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Mok, 2000; Lippmann and Cunningham, 2000). However, to our knowledge, the ANN guided by GA used in this study, has
never been used in the intrusion detection context. In this section, we provide a general description of ANN and GA.
Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs)
ANNs are the most dominant data mining method at present (Sung et al., 1999). Originally developed in an attempt to mimic
the neural functions of a human brain, ANNs are powerful prediction and classification tools, and provide new opportunities
for solving difficult problems that have been traditionally modeled using statistical approaches. Although many different
multilayer ANN architectures are available for addressing classification problems, the backpropagation (BP) architecture is
probably the most popular and widely used (Caudill, 1991; Zhu et al., 2001). A BP network consists of several components:
(1) a set of neurons or processing units that receive and send signals from an outside environment or other neurons in the net-
work using three layers – input, hidden, and output; (2) connectivity, which shows the interactivity between neurons; (3) ac-
tivation/transfer functions, which convert the aggregated inputs into an output that is sent to other connected neurons; and (4)
learning algorithms, which update the patterns and strength of the connectivity. Most of the time, the network starts with a
random set of weights and adjusts the weights each time it detects an input-output pair of errors. During the training period,
various classes of training data are fed into the network. In traditional BP network, training is an iterative process of minimiz-
ing the differences between the desired output and the actual output of the network using a least squares approach. The dif-
ference between the actual output and the desired output is calculated and back-propagated to the previous layer(s), which
causes a series of adjustments to the function weights in order to reduce the observed output errors. The whole process is re-
peated layer by layer throughout the network. Based on the error signals received, connection weights are repeatedly updated
until the network converges toward a stable state.
Genetic Algorithms (GA)
GAs are designed to solve problems in which an optimal solution is required given a very large number of possible solutions.
Although mathematical techniques exist for these types of problems, the mathematical techniques do not work well when the
number of possible solutions is very high. GAs handle these computationally intense problems by borrowing a technique
from nature. Specifically, GAs use natural selection, or survival of the fittest, to find the optimal solution.
The process followed by a GA starts by generating a random population of possible solutions which are represented by bi-
nary  strings  known as  chromosomes.  The  individual  bits  in  each chromosome are  called  genes.  Mimicking the  nature,  the
genetic algorithm produces a solution based on an objective function (in our case, the maximum rate of correct classification)
by evolving the chromosomes over a number of generations. In each generation the genetic algorithm performs three opera-
tions on the chromosomes: selection, crossover, and mutation. In selection, the genetic algorithm decides which chromo-
somes will survive into the next generation and which chromosomes will not— selecting the fittest members of the popula-
tion. During crossover, pair of chromosomes swaps genes— mating the fittest members by combining the gene pool. Finally,
in the mutation operation randomly selected genes have their values swapped. This randomness added in this operation pre-
vents the GA from producing a sub-optimal solution. Thus, the use of these three operations by GAs allows them to handle a
wide variety of problems while producing optimal solutions quickly.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Data Collection
The dataset used in this study was initially acquired at the MIT Lincoln Labs. The data was collected as a part of the 1998
Intrusion Detection Evaluation Program funded by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). A standard
set of data was audited including a wide variety of intrusions simulated in a military network environment. Lincoln Labs set
up an environment to acquire nine weeks of raw TCP dump data for a local area network (LAN) simulating a typical U.S. Air
Force LAN. They operated the LAN as it were a true Air Force environment. A version of this dataset was used in the 1999
KDD intrusion detection contest. We acquired the dataset from the KDD contest web site1.
There are two datasets: training and validation. The training dataset had about five million connection records (4,898,430)
and the validation dataset had about three million connection records (2,984,153). A connection is defined as a sequence of
TCP packets starting and ending at some well defined times, between which data flows to and from a source IP address to a
target IP address under some well defined protocol. In these datasets, each connection is labeled as either normal, or as an
1 http://kdd.ics.uci.edu/databases/kddcup99/kddcup99.html
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attack, with exactly one specific attack type (see Table 1 for various attack types). The connection records have a set of fea-
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Table 1. Network Attack Types
Variable Name Data Type Description
duration continuous. length (number of seconds) of the connection
protocol_type: symbolic. type of the protocol, e.g. tcp, udp, etc.
service: symbolic. Network service on the destination, e.g., http, telnet, etc.
flag: symbolic. normal or error status of the connection
src_bytes: continuous. number of data bytes from source to destination
dst_bytes: continuous. number of data bytes from destination to source
land: symbolic. 1 if connection is from/to the same host/port; 0 otherwise
wrong_fragment: continuous. number of ``wrong'' fragments
urgent: continuous. number of urgent packets
hot: continuous. number of ``hot'' indicators
num_failed_logins: continuous. number of failed login attempts
logged_in: symbolic. 1 if successfully logged in; 0 otherwise
num_compromised: continuous. number of ``compromised'' conditions
root_shell: continuous. 1 if root shell is obtained; 0 otherwise
su_attempted: continuous. 1 if ``su root'' command attempted; 0 otherwise
num_root: continuous. number of ``root'' accesses
num_file_creations: continuous. number of file creation operations
num_shells: continuous. number of shell prompts
num_access_files: continuous. number of operations on access control files
num_outbound_cmds: continuous. number of outbound commands in an ftp session
is_host_login: symbolic. 1 if the login belongs to the ``hot'' list; 0 otherwise
is_guest_login: symbolic. 1 if the login is a ``guest''login; 0 otherwise
count: continuous. number of connections to the same host as the current connection in
the past two seconds
srv_count: continuous. number of connections to the same service as the current connection
in the past two seconds
serror_rate: continuous. % of connections that have ``SYN'' errors
srv_serror_rate: continuous. % of connections that have ``SYN'' errors
rerror_rate: continuous. % of connections that have ``REJ'' errors
srv_rerror_rate: continuous. % of connections that have ``REJ'' errors
same_srv_rate: continuous. % of connections to the same service
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diff_srv_rate: continuous. % of connections to different services
srv_diff_host_rate: continuous. % of connections to different hosts
dst_host_count: continuous. number of connections to the same destination as the current con-
nection in the past two seconds
dst_host_srv_count: continuous. number of connections to the same destination as the current con-
nection in the past two seconds
dst_host_same_srv_rate: continuous. % of connections to the same destination
dst_host_diff_srv_rate: continuous. % of connections to different destination services
dst_host_same_src_port_rate: continuous. % of connections to different source ports
dst_host_srv_diff_host_rate:  continuous. % of connections to different destination hosts
dst_host_serror_rate: continuous. % of connections that have ``SYN'' errors
dst_host_srv_serror_rate: continuous. % of connections that have ``SYN'' errors
dst_host_rerror_rate: continuous. % of connections that have ``REJ'' errors
dst_host_srv_rerror_rate: continuous. % of connections that have ``REJ'' errors
output symbolic Attack type for each connection record
Table 2. Variable List
It should be noted that the validation data has additional attack types not present in the training data. This makes the whole
study more realistic. The training dataset contains a total of 24 attack types, while the validation dataset had 14 additional
attack types.
Data Preprocessing
Data preprocessing is an important first step before doing any data mining experiments. In the preprocessing phase, we per-
formed the following tasks: (1) we sampled the training and validation data to draw sets of a manageable size; (2) we coded
the alphanumeric values into numeric values; and (3) we checked for missing values.
Sampling is performed using SAS Enterprise Miner’s (version 4.3) sampling node. At first, we imported both the training and
validation datasets into a SAS library. We generated two datasets based on random sampling each with 10,000 records for
training and validation purposes. Sampling is recommended for extremely large datasets in order to optimize the model fit-
ting time.
Coding was one of the most important tasks in our data preprocessing phase. Coding was required because the datasets con-
tain alphanumeric data in four variables. We coded these alphanumeric data in such a way that the dataset only contained
numeric data. The four variables that were coded are: protocol_type, service, flag, and classification. We followed a bi-
nary/dummy coding technique. After the coding, we ended up with 105 input variables and 5 output variables— i.e., normal,
probe, DOS, U2R, and R2L (see Tables 1 and 2).
We investigated the datasets for missing data and could not find any missing data. We did not remove any influence points
(outliers and leverage points) because in a real world network intrusion detection scenario, it is not practical to remove a con-
nection record because that record may be a potential network intrusion.
Neural Network Development Methodology
Standard ANN
We used the SAS Enterprise Miner’s (version 4.3) neural network feature as the standard ANN. SAS Enterprise Miner neural
network is a standard multilayer BP network. The objective function was based on minimizing the average squared error.
Objective function based on the maximization of correct classification rate was not available in Enterprise Miner. For the
most part, we did not change the default configurations of the Enterprise Miner because we wanted it to be a representative of
a standard ANN.
ANN Guided by GA
The basic architecture of the alternative method was very similar to that of the standard ANN. The primary difference was
that in this method, the objective function was developed to maximize the correct classification rate and the network optimi-
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zation methodology was based on the use of a GA as provided by the Gene Hunter DLL library and Microsoft Excel interface
of the Ward Systems2.
Maximization of the correct classification rate is not a well-behaved optimization problem and therefore, a GA is ideal for
this optimization task. Before the genetic algorithm could be executed, the training and validation data had to be preprocessed
beyond what was detailed earlier. To be specific, each data value had to be standardized between -1 and 1. This standardiza-
tion was required because the equations used in the spreadsheet employed the hyperbolic tangent function. Since the function
returns values from -1 to 1, all input values were standardized to the same range. In order to standardize the data, the mini-
mum value and the range was calculated for each variable. With these values calculated, each data point’s standardized value
was calculated using the following function:
standardized value =  ((data point – minimum)/range) * 2 – 1
With the training and validation data standardized, the GA parameters were set to maximize the classification rate. Additional
parameters that were set included the chromosome length which was set to continuous and the population size which was set
to 1,000 chromosomes.
RESULTS
Table 3 presents the standard ANN classification for both training and validation data. For each attack type, the results show
how many were classified correctly and how many were classified incorrectly. Using the training data, the standard ANN was
able to produce a model with a fairly high correct classification rate (97.77%). When the model was applied to the validation
data, the correct classification rate dropped significantly (81.75%). It should be noted that in both cases (training and valida-
tion), the neural network method was only able to classify normal connections and DOS attacks. It failed to correctly identify
any of the other three attacks.
Training Validation
Predicted Predicted
Actual Correct Incorrect Total Actual Correct Incorrect Total
Normal 1892 105 1997 Normal 1086 898 1984
Probe 0 87 87 Probe 0 131 131
DOS 7885 15 7900 DOS 7089 331 7420
U2R 0 5 5 U2R 0 6 6
R2L 0 11 11 R2L 0 459 459
Total 9777 223 10000 Total 8175 1825 10000
 Correct Classification Rate = 97.77%  Correct Classification Rate = 81.75%
Table 3. Standard ANN Results
Table 4 presents the results of the ANN guided by GA. As the table shows, this method provides a greater degree of classifi-
cation specificity. Using the training data, the genetic algorithm produced a model with a 99.07% correct classification rate.
Applying the model to the validation data produced a correct classification rate of 90.67%. Not only did it report the number
of correct and incorrect classifications by type, it also reported into which type the incorrectly classified connection records
had been placed (see Table 5).
2 This feature is no longer available in newer versions of Microsoft Excel. Therefore, we used an older version of Excel that
came with Microsoft Office 95.
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Training Validation
Predicted Predicted
Actual Correct Incorrect Total Actual Correct Incorrect Total
Normal 1997 0 1997 Normal 1942 42 1984
Probe 24 63 87 Probe 59 72 131
DOS 7886 14 7900 DOS 7066 354 7420
U2R 0 5 5 U2R 0 6 6
R2L 0 11 11 R2L 0 459 459
Total 9907 93 10000 Total 9067 933 10000
 Correct Classification Rate = 99.07%  Correct Classification Rate = 90.67%
Table 4. ANN guided by GA Results
Training
Predicted
Actual Normal Probe DOS U2R R2L Total
Normal 1997 0 0 0 0 1997
Probe 41 24 22 0 0 87
DOS 11 3 7886 0 0 7900
U2R 5 0 0 0 0 5
R2L 11 0 0 0 0 11
Total 2065 27 7908 0 0 10000
 Correct Classification Rate = 99.07%
Validation
Predicted
Actual Normal Probe DOS U2R R2L Total
Normal 1942 1 41 0 0 1984
Probe 28 59 44 0 0 131
DOS 310 44 7066 0 0 7420
U2R 5 1 0 0 0 6
R2L 452 0 7 0 0 459
Total 2737 105 7158 0 0 10000
 Correct Classification Rate = 90.67%
Table 5. Detailed Results for ANN guided by GA
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
Given the aforementioned classification results, identifying the “best” data mining method by comparing correct classifica-
tion rate was a straightforward exercise. The ANN guided by GA performed significantly better than the standard ANN. As
mentioned earlier, the standard ANN returned a correct/incorrect classification by type. The ANN guided by GA returned a
classification matrix that shows the correct classifications by type, as well as, the incorrect classifications by type (see Table
5). The standard ANN did not produce this level of specificity.
The primary reason for the ANN guided by GA to perform better is the objective function which is maximization of the cor-
rect classification rate as opposed to minimizing average squared error which is the objective function of the standard ANN.
In the context of network detection in which classifying the connection is the most important criteria, maximizing the correct
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classification rate is a more applicable objective function. However, in most standard BP network, the objective function
deals with minimizing the squared error. Therefore, the ANN guided by GA is a better data mining method in network detec-
tion purposes.
As noted earlier, the ANN guided by GA provided a detailed result (see Table 5) which can be beneficial to network adminis-
trators. However, the question then becomes ‘Is such detail necessary?’ The ability to know where, and how, the classifica-
tion method failed is important if the method is to be improved. In the case of network intrusion, a simpler method may de-
tect that a connection attempt is an attack, but it may misclassify the type of attack (ex. probe attack classified as a DOS at-
tack). On the positive side, the probe attack has still been detected. On the negative side, the method may miss the next probe
attack because its classification pattern is incorrect. Without the detail provided by the ANN guided by GA classification
matrix as shown in Table 5, this misclassification would go unnoticed.
From decision making perspective, using the methods discussed here, IT managers will be able to detect various attacks and
decide about network security mechanisms and implementation strategies. As mentioned earlier, the cost of network intrusion
is alarmingly high. The ability to make quick decisions regarding network attacks will help the IT managers to reduce the
cost of intrusion significantly. In that regard, data mining methods discussed here could be vital for IT managers.
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
Although this study makes a contribution to the literature on network intrusion classification, there are also a number of limi-
tations. The most significant limitation is the inability to incorporate other data mining methods, such as decision trees,
memory-based systems, logistic regression, and discriminant analysis. One of the reasons for not including the other methods
is that most of these methods (e.g., logistic regression) can only provide two-group classification. But one of our objectives in
this study was to classify network attacks in to multiple groups. However, the lack of a full comparison across different data
mining methods limits the ability to draw firm conclusions and leaves some doubt as to the validity of the conclusions that
were drawn.
Future research in this area is definitely needed. Future studies could create customized algorithms which employ the classi-
fication methods used here, but produce results that are more comparable. Also, other data mining methods should be incor-
porated. Studies could also be conducted with more attack types which are totally new, or variations on existing types. In this
vein, other studies could address the problem of classifying rarely seen attack types like the U2R and R2L. Because of their
rarity these attacks are hard to develop patterns for and consequently difficult to detect, as was seen in our classification re-
sults.
CONCLUSION
Network intrusion is not a problem which will be going away. On the contrary, research indicates that it will be getting sig-
nificantly worse (Zhu et al., 2001). Based on the need for networks to detect attacks, and the difficulty associated with detec-
tion, this paper has proposed the expanded use of data mining to address the problem. The ability of data mining to extract
patterns from existing data makes it an excellent choice for use in intrusion detection. Both methods tested in this paper per-
formed well in classifying the training data. However, the ANN guided by GA performed much better with the validation
data. Considering that the validation data had 14 additional attack types not present in the training data, these results show the
potential value of using the ANN guided by GA method in classifying network intrusions.
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